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ABSTRACT 
The First Amendment is an important value in American liberal polity. Under this value, 
racism, hate speech and offensive speech are protected speech. This article 
scrutinizes one of the clear representatives of the American liberal polity - Thomas 
Scanlon. The paper tracks the developments in his theory over the years. It is argued 
that Scanlon’s arguments downplay tangible harm that speech might inflict on its target 
victim audience. Scanlon’s distinction between participant interests, audience 
interests, and the interests of bystanders is put under close scrutiny. The article 
criticizes viewpoint neutrality and suggests a balancing approach, further arguing that 
democracy is required to develop protective mechanisms against harm-facilitating 
speech as well as profound offences. Both should be taken most seriously. 
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This article takes issue with the popular liberal stance that the Free Speech Principle 
should protect even the most harmful and vile expression because such protection 
would promote individual self-government, enhance individual autonomy and promote 
critical thinking. Democracy depends on self-determining agents who take part in 
public deliberation.1 This article argues for striking a balance between these goods 
and the impact of the speech in question on its target group. The protection of free 
speech cannot be offered in isolation from its wider consequences, not only those that 
affect the speaker but also those that affect those whom the speaker intended to 
influence. Furthermore, the content of the speech should be evaluated at its face 
value. 
 The essay opens with an explanation of the liberal reasoning for freedom of 
speech and why it is especially forceful in the United States. I proceed by discussing 
the theory of one protagonists of one strand of American liberalism, 2  Thomas 
Scanlon’s Contractual theory. The paper traces the developments in Scanlon’s free 
speech theory over the years and focuses on the contractualism argument. 
Contractualism promotes the “protection of interests” of different stakeholders. 
Scanlon ascribes strong protection to the speaker, sometimes at the expense of 
protecting the basic rights of their target group. The paper criticises the American 
viewpoint neutrality, invoking instead mid-ground position dictated by the principles of 
respect for others, not harming others, and the Offence to Sensibilities Argument. My 
position weighs different interests and calls for assigning greater protection to 




 The writing of this article has benefited from exchanges with Thomas Scanlon 
who generously provided comments on a previous draft and attended to subsequent 
queries aimed to elucidate specific points. 
 
The Liberal Free Speech Principle 
Liberalism was a product of the climate of opinion that emerged at the time of the 
Renaissance and the Reformation. As the political expression of the new individualism, 
it was a political declaration of faith in the autonomy of human reason and the essential 
goodness of man. In Chapter 4 of On Liberty: The limits to the authority of society over 
the individual, John Stuart Mill writes that people may take advice from others but the 
final decision should be made by them. Individuals should be the final judges of their 
action: “Considerations to aid his judgment, urgings to strengthen his will, may be 
offered to him and even pushed at him by others; but he is the final judge. Any errors 
that he is likely to commit against advice and warning are far outweighed by the evil 
of allowing others to constrain him to what they think to be his good.”3 The belief in 
human reason and in the essential goodness of humanity reflected the political, social, 
religious, and economic aspirations of the rising commercial classes. Thus, in The Rise 
of European Liberalism, Laski argues that Liberalism has been, over the last four 
centuries, "the outstanding doctrine of Western Civilization.”4  
 The preservation of individual rights, and the emancipation of the individual from 
public control mean that all people in liberal democracy enjoy the same equal rights. No 
group is preferred over others. The majority decides the identity of government but it 
should not undermine equal rights for all. Liberalism sets the individual on a legal equality 
in opposition to feudalism and challenges the right of the monarch to govern except in 




 It is from the concept of a person as an autonomous individual, whose actions are 
the product of choice and purpose, that the philosophy of a free society is constructed. 
Liberal society makes the common good available not to a privileged class but to all, so 
far as the capacity of each permits the individual to share it. The purpose of such a 
society, according to this view, is to increase the capacities by which the individual can 
contribute to the common good.  
During the past forty years, we have witnessed a significant increase in the 
number of debates about the boundaries of freedom of expression in the western 
world. Liberals warn that if we restrict speech, this might lead to an increasing 
tendency towards law and order legislation;5 to the creation of undergrounds;6 to 
outburst of violence, rage, aggression and use of illegal means;7 to abuse of power 
on part of the government;8 to more censorship,9 or to a less tolerant society.10 
Liberals promote freedom of expression and warn against government’s tendency to 
abuse its powers. We have seen that this warning is well founded. Past experience 
has shown that different governments were tempted to abuse their powers to promote 
partisan interests and to undermine their opposition.  
In the United States, trust in government used to be high up until the 1950s but 
a string of events from then on has eroded that trust. As a result of the "Red Scare" 
and the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, Senator Joseph 
McCarthy directed investigations towards Hollywood and the intellectual community. 
During the McCarthyism period (1947-1957) basic civil rights of out-of-favour 
individuals were harmed by the government.11 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, as 
the USA was recovering from McCarthyism, public trust in government was relatively 
high, but the trust in government declined in the late 1960s.12 The Vietnam War (1959-




resulted in the resignation of President Richard Nixon in August 1974 (the only 
resignation of a US president), certainly did not relax the growing suspicions towards 
government. Mismanagement of the economy did not help, and George W. Bush’s 
“war on terror”, including the war waged on Iraq for unclear motives, has further 
undermined the American public trust in its government. Thus public trust in 
government has plummeted from 73% in 1958 to 58% in 1973 and continued to drop 
to 19% in 2013. According to recent Pew Research Reports, just 19%-20% of 
Americans say they are basically content with the federal government and think the 
federal government runs its programs well.13 Liberals fear that the government might 
abuse its power to bar speech on partisan, political grounds for good reasons.     
The United States is known to hold the most tolerant view in the democratic 
world on hate speech. The First Amendment instructs that “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press”.14 The right of the people peaceably 
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” is an 
enshrined, prominent value in the American political and civic culture. The 
development of the First Amendment Doctrine occurred against the backdrop of 
segregation and the Civil Rights movement. This involved southern states deliberately 
applying speech silencing measures to try and stop the struggle for black equality.15 
In order to prevent state governments restricting political speech, the US Supreme 
Court adopted strict viewpoint neutrality. Viewpoint neutrality reflects lack of trust in 
government.16  
The United States pays a price for tolerating hate as some of those speeches 
translate into hate crimes. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, during 




murders of nearly 100 people.17 But American liberals hold that there is no need to 
panic or to be afraid of such vile ideas. Instead, we need to expose the falsity of hatred 
and educate to tolerance and equal liberties for all.  
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) among other organizations has 
supported the rights of racist and anti-Semitic organizations, most notoriously the Ku 
Klux Klan and the American National Socialist Party, to speak, to demonstrate, to 
march, and to organize.18 In their defense of radical political groups, the ACLU and 
others have not claimed that the words, pictures, and symbols of such groups have no 
negative consequences.19 The constitutional protection accorded to the freedom of 
speech is not based on a naïve belief that speech can do no harm but on the 
confidence that the benefits society reaps from the free flow and exchange of ideas 
outweigh the costs society endures by allowing reprehensible and even dangerous 
ideas. Some free speech activists acknowledged that the racist and anti-Semitic 
images and discourse of these groups might offend and harm the targeted individuals, 
might corrupt the level and nature of civic discourse, and might increase the probability 
of hate crimes.20 Yet the admission of speech’s causal propensities and harmful 
consequences has not lessened the strength of the Free Speech Principle. The Nazis 
and the KKK have free speech rights not because what they say is harmless, but 
despite their harmful expressions.21   
Other liberals, such as Dworkin and Nagel, explicitly recommend purely 
deontological justifications for a libertarian approach to free speech. It is wrong for 
hate speech and the like to be censored, according to Dworkin and Nagel, even if the 
overall costs of hate speech (for its targets, or for society as a whole) outweigh any 
benefits. For Dworkin,22 this conclusion follows from “taking rights seriously”, upon 




and explained that “the sovereignty of each person’s reason over his own beliefs and 
values requires that he be permitted to express them, expose them to the reaction of 
others, and defend them against objections”.23 For Nagel,24 freedom of expression is 
a nonderivative and fundamental element of morality. Indeed, nonconsequentialist 
justifications for free speech are an important element in defenses of American free 
speech doctrine. Thus, American liberals who argue for the protection of racist and 
hateful speech see this kind of speech for both intrinsic or consequentialist reasons as 
the litmus case for tolerance. After all, tolerance is precisely about challenging 
expressions, not pleasantries. 
 Those who challenge this stand and wish to limit the bigot’s speech question 
why should the racist, who wishes to deny equal status and respect to others due to 
their race, be entitled to equal status and respect. They argue that the racist is 
excluding himself from the liberal shield by denying equality for all. But liberals insist 
on maintaining high standards and on not becoming “like them”.25 Believing that the 
liberal standards are right, correct, just and true, liberals think that through the battles 
of words and the free market of opinions the liberal truth will eventually gain the upper 
hand over the vile speech. This is Ronald Dworkin’s view. Dworkin sees any 
infringement by the state on the content of speech as denying the equality of citizens.26 
Liberals are willing to take risk and pay a price in adhering to their noble principles. 
The liberal state should respect the rights of racist speakers to “contribute” to the 
society’s “moral climate” although liberals acknowledge that the racists actually 
undermine the moral climate. Liberals may even argue that we have an obligation to 
listen to the racist diatribes and then choose our response. We may choose to ignore 




confront the racist ideas with our benevolent ideas and persuade the racist, or others 
who listen to the debate, of the truism of the liberal moral ideas. 
Thomas Scanlon does acknowledge the harm that might result from the speech 
in question but he does not evince great concern to explain the circumstances and 
conditions that constitute exceptions to free speech. It is argued that Scanlon’s 
terminology often obscures and the reasoning is not fully articulated. For instance, in 
"A Theory of Freedom of Expression", Scanlon offers his own interpretation of the 
Millian Free Speech Principle. He does acknowledge the harmful effects of certain 
forms of speech and devotes the last two pages of his essay to the ‘near catastrophe’ 
exception to the Free Speech Principle. However, Scanlon fails to explain adequately 
what exactly he means by this.27 I now turn to discuss his theory in some detail. 
 
Scanlon’s Contractualism 
Scanlon initially attempted to construct a theory of freedom of speech which would 
consider the extent to which defenders of such freedom of speech have to rest their case 
on the claim that the long-term benefits of free expression outweigh obvious and possibly 
severe short-run costs, and to what extent this calculation of long-term advantages 
depends upon placing a high value on autonomy and intellectual pursuits as opposed to 
other values. Scanlon's theory is aimed to limit the powers of a state to those which 
citizens could recognize while still regarding themselves as equal, autonomous, rational 
agents.  
In 1972, Scanlon published “A Theory of Freedom of Expression”. 28  He 
considered a number of ways in which expressions can result in harm, focusing on 
cases where harms can clearly be counted as reasons for restricting the acts that give 




justification for restricting free speech, only that they can always be taken into 
account.29 Scanlon admitted that it is difficult to discern when exactly legal liability in 
the list of provided cases arises, and he did not offer any thesis as to what constitutes 
being an accessory, inciting or conspiring to a harmful action. Scanlon maintained that 
this has to be something more than merely the communication of persuasive reason 
for harmful action.30 In his obscure fashion, Scanlon did not clarify what this meant. 
Subsequently Scanlon offered the Millian Principle:31  
There are certain harms which, although they would not occur but for 
certain acts of expression, nonetheless cannot be taken as part of a 
justification for legal restrictions on these acts. These harms are: (a) harms 
to certain individuals which consist in their coming to have false beliefs as 
a result of those acts of expression; (b) harmful consequences of acts 
performed as a result of those acts of expression, where the connection 
between the acts of expression and the subsequent harmful acts consists 
merely in the fact that the act of expression led the agents to believe (or 
increased their tendency to believe) these acts to be worth performing.32 
 
In other words, justifications for legal restrictions on speech should not include 
speech that led people to hold false beliefs or that led people to believe (or increased 
their tendency to believe) that certain harmful acts are worth performing. Scanlon 
viewed the Millian Principle as the basic principle of freedom of expression and rejected 
any goal-based or consequentialist reasons that might interfere with this principle.33 
Following the Millian defense of liberty of thought and discussion, Scanlon argued that 
speech may not be prohibited on the grounds that harms to individuals or society may 




given the freedom to make judgments and decide for themselves. The problem with this 
theory is that it presents a very limited view of freedom of expression. Following Mill, 
every expression that is short of incitement to inflicting physical harm to others was 
protected.34  Later, Scanlon explained that the Millian principle was not intended to 
provide a complete account of freedom of expression, and that its function was to keep 
certain considerations “out of the scales” of justification.35 Then Scanlon retracted the 
Millian principle altogether having realized that the relative value of different forms of 
expression does make a difference independently from the idea of autonomy.36 I will 
return to this retraction later on. 
 In his early writing, Scanlon assumed that autonomy is something that is very 
valuable (or to be more precise, something that is the source of strong pro tanto 
reasons for action), irrespective of whether people in fact recognise it or conceive of it 
as valuable. Scanlon acknowledges that the requirements of autonomy are extremely 
weak because, according to Scanlon’s perception, an autonomous person may be still 
subject to coercion.37 For Scanlon, what is important is the acceptance of coercion, 
not the state of affairs. One may argue that coercion as such undermines autonomy, 
notwithstanding one’s willingness to be subjected to this state of affairs. Autonomy 
and coercion are defined by each other's absence: one is autonomous if one is not 
coerced, and to the extent that one is coerced, one is not autonomous.38 Elsewhere I 
have argued that people who internalized coercion and accepted limitations on their 
lives are less autonomous than other people who fight against coercion.39 I agree with 
Scanlon that it is consistent with a person’s autonomy for the law to restrict her 
freedom of action for her own good, for instance by dictating certain safety measures 




 Scanlon’s article is over 40 years old. It no longer represents Scanlon’s official 
view, and it is not commonly appealed to in actual First Amendment case law. 
Moreover, Scanlon’s general strategy for defending free speech – by identifying free 
speech as a condition of state legitimacy – has been much more comprehensively 
developed in recent literature, by Post,41 Heinze,42 and Weinstein.43 These authors 
argue that liberal democracies should safeguard freedom of expression not just as an 
individual right but as an essential attribute of democratic citizenship. These authors 
challenge state regulation of public discourse by promoting a positive view of 
participatory democracy and arguing that speech restrictions undermine political 
legitimacy. Robert Post, for instance, wrote that “public discourse consists of the 
various kinds of communicative action to which citizens must have unrestricted access 
if this belief is to be sustained”.44 It is comprised of “those processes of communication 
that must remain open to the participation of citizens if democratic legitimacy is to be 
maintained.” Democratic legitimacy depends upon citizens who believe that their 
government is responsive to their wishes.45  
 In a later article, Scanlon claimed that his reasoning employed the idea of 
autonomy as a constraint on justifications of authority. 46  Interpreted in this way, 
autonomy which is naturally concerned with the agents (as evidenced by Baker),47 in 
the Scanlonian formulation it reaches conclusions which are far broader in character, 
with implications to the nature of democracy (this may be called “arguments from 
democracy”) such as those espoused by Neier,48 Bollinger49 and Richards50 and 
also implications on the conditions for the discovery of truth (“arguments from truth”) 
identified first and foremost with John Stuart Mill.51 In the 1979 article, Scanlon spoke 
again of the contribution of freedom of expression for enhancing one’s autonomy. He 




conceptions of the good, forming beliefs and desires, and influence social change. But 
autonomy is not necessarily about bringing social change or forming true beliefs. The 
notion of autonomy involves the ability to reflect upon beliefs and actions, and the ability 
to form an idea regarding them, so as to decide the way in which to lead a life. For by 
deciding among their own conflicting trends, individuals consolidate their opinions more 
fully and review the ranking of values for themselves with a clear frame of mind. The 
distinguishing feature of autonomy is, therefore, the forming of our discretion in a way 
that is supported by our reason, though our rationality might be impaired. Scanlon would 
agree that choosing the best option or thinking correctly is not a requirement for 
autonomy so long as the doer exercises deliberation in assessing the alternatives. The 
emphasis is not on deciding the "best" options, or on holding the "true" opinions, but on 
the way in which we come to make the decisions and to hold our opinions. 
I will not further elaborate on these arguments because Scanlon himself came to 
reject them. In the “Introduction” to The Difficulty of Tolerance, Scanlon explained that 
he tried to test the Millian Principle on several cases and failed because it placed too 
tight a constraint on possible justifications for restricting expression.52  As he was 
writing his 1979 article "Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression", 
Scanlon came to reject the autonomy based theory of his 1972 article because he 
realized it was a mistake to treat autonomy as a filter, one reason being that this limited 
excessively the reasons for restricting expression.53 Thus the 1979 paper rejected the 
1972 one. Scanlon then turned to examine the broad issue of rights. Contractualism, 
which became Scanlon’s new overall view, recognizes that the justifiability of actions 
or policies to others depends on the reasons they have to object to the way these 




Scanlon’s general statement of his later view is that freedom of expression is a 
set of constraints on the powers of governments to regulate expression that are (a) 
necessary to protect certain important interests and (b) provide this protection at 
tolerable cost to other interests. The right to freedom of expression is about putting 
constraints on government interference with expression and acting positively to protect 
speakers. In both cases, different interests are to be taken into account, including the 
interest that we all have in the kind of society in which we live. Scanlon emphasizes 
this in The Difficulty of Tolerance.55 
At the heart of Scanlon’s free speech regulation lies his deep suspicion of 
government. In a recent paper “Moral Rights and Constitutional Rights”, Scanlon 
reflects on a walk he had with his father in the early 1950’s when he was denouncing, 
with pre-teen-age passion, an article in his local newspaper on some pressing political 
questions, which seemed to him extremely slanted. “How can they be allowed to print 
such things”, Scanlon asked his father, “when they are so false and misleading?” The 
father replied: “But who’s to decide which things can be printed and which cannot?”56 
Scanlon writes that he was stunned by this Socratic question, and he testifies that he 
has been thinking about the question ever since. Scanlon essentially answers this 
question by saying: Everyone may decide for oneself. The government has better 
things to do. 
 
Interests of Participants, Audiences and Bystanders 
In both 1979 and 2003 writings, Scanlon distinguishes between interests of 
participants, interests of audiences, and interests of bystanders. The most general 
participant interest is to be able to call something to the attention of a wide audience. 




most general audience interest is to have expression available to them should they 
wish to attend to it. People wish to be informed, amused, stimulated and even 
provoked when this leads to self-reflection and growth. 58  These interests may 
complete with each other when the speaker addresses issues that are of interest to 
the audience, or they may come into conflict when the audience is not interested in 
the speaker’s expression. The third interest of bystanders is generally applied to 
restrict speech as bystanders wish to avoid the undesirable side effects of 
expressions: traffic jams, noise, litter etc.59 Scanlon rightly asserts that protecting 
bystanders does not require curtailing speech altogether but only to regulate time, 
place and manner of expression. He speaks of the central interest of the audience in 
having a good environment for the formation of its beliefs and desires. We all wish, as 
spectators and as speakers, to promote a framework within which we might pursue 
our ideas and beliefs. Balance has to be struck between the different interests. 
Scanlon moves on to discuss the value of having a fair and effective democratic 
political institutions.60 While we have an interest in having a functional government 
that would serve our best interests, we should also be aware of the likelihood of 
government abuse of power. Scanlon warns that giving the government the authority 
presents a serious threat to participant and audience interests. 61  Governments, 
Scanlon further warns, have a tendency “to try to silence their critics”, and they also 
tend to be “unsympathetic to ideas, values and points of view that are unpopular in the 
society at large”.62 Like many American liberals (Meiklejohn;63 Baker;64 Hardin;65 
Volokh;66 Nye, Zelikow and King;67 Stone,68 Richards),69 Scanlon does not trust 
government to make the right and just decision.70 He believes that governments, 
whether elected or not, have a settled tendency to try to silence their critics. But, I 




as to which interests override others. It is unclear who will make the decisions if it is 
not the government.71 
Scanlon’s reasoning continues a line of reasoning adopted by American 
liberals, champions of freedom of expression, who chose to shy away from clear 
prescriptions. Consider Alexander Meiklejohn who asserted that a government of free 
men can properly be controlled only by itself. Meiklejohn explained: “If We, the People 
are to be controlled, then We, the People must do the controlling. As a corporate body, 
we must exercise control over our separate members.”72 But what does it mean? 
Meiklejohn suspected that this assertion might need further explanation, thus he 
elaborated: “What it means is that the body politic, organized as a nation, must 
recognize its own limitations of wisdom and of temper and of circumstance, and must, 
therefore, make adequate provision for self-criticism and self-restraint. The 
government itself must limit the government, must determine what it may and may not 
do. It must make sure that its attempts to make men free do not result in making them 
slaves”.73  
The problems, however, are twofold: first, Meiklejohn and also Scanlon do not 
trust government to make decision for the people. If the government is suspect when 
it relates to the people, it is even more suspect when it concerns itself as conflicts of 
interests are unavoidable. As no specific provision is provided as to how the 
government should limit itself, which adequate provisions should be made available, 
and what criteria should guide the decision-making processes (beside the stringent 
belief in liberty), the road for all kinds of interpretations is opened wide. Furthermore, 
Meiklejohn’s view of broad liberty might be counter-productive. For instance, if 
manipulators of the system will be granted absolute liberty to pursue their interests, 




Scanlon understands 'interests' broadly, as what an individual has reason to 
want. He develops his theory of individual interests as far as the category of 
bystanders is concerned and refrains from speaking of the overall societal interests in 
promoting a good environment. Scanlon seemed to believe that the three categories 
of participants, audience members and bystanders are exhaustive of the individual 
points of view. Scanlon also believes that speech-acts are fundamental human 
interests, and he concedes that additional information is sometimes not worth the cost 
of getting it; we should not be willing to bear unlimited costs to allow expression to 
flourish under his principle.74 Scanlon also recognizes that speech not related to 
political issues may legitimately be restricted on paternalistic grounds. However, 
where political issues are concerned, Scanlon advocates a strong level of protection 
for expression: "where political issues are involved governments are notoriously 
partisan and unreliable. Therefore, giving government the authority to make policy by 
balancing interests in such cases presents a serious threat to particularly important 
participant and audience interests."75 But the participant and the audience might have 
very different, even contradictory interests, as was the case in Skokie, one of the 
suburbs of Chicago, inhabited mostly by Jews, some hundreds of them being survivors 
of Nazi concentration camps, when Nazis attempted to march specifically there.76 
Scanlon’s suspicion of government brought him to protect Nazi free expression while 
discounting the harm that might be inflicted on the Jews of Skokie.77 Other liberals, 
including Joel Feinberg,78 Jeremy Waldron79 and the present author80 think that 
protecting the target group’s interests was more important than allowing the Nazi 
march in Skokie. Concurring with them, I think that in this case, the seriousness of the 




should also be noted that Mill did not draw a distinction between political and non-
political speech.81 
Frank Collin, the leader of the Nazi group, did not attempt to hurt the Jews 
physically. His group was too small and thus incapable to carry out such an attack. He 
decided to assert his free speech constitutional right in Skokie because of the large 
number of Holocaust survivors.82 The Nazi assembly in Skokie is not protected under 
the Free Speech Principle because the survivors were put in an impossible situation. 
If they were to challenge the Nazis, they would have to face the swastika, the uniform, 
the hatred, forcing them to relive the horrors they had escaped. And if they were to 
decide to stay at home, draw the curtains and block their ears, they still would have 
difficulties to reconcile to the idea that Nazism could pass in their own vicinity. 
Psychological studies of Holocaust survivors showed that they were extremely 
vulnerable to profoundly painful reaction were they confronted with situations that 
triggered memories of their horrific experiences at the hands of the Nazis.83 Profound 
offence amounts to attack on one’s sensibilities. The target group might enter a state 
of shock. When a Nazi enters a Jewish place with a swastika armband, he need not 
say anything. His message is loud and clear. No one can mistakenly interpret this 
message of hate as something positive. Such symbolic speech encapsulates both 
content and manner of speech. 
An irreversible offence to the sensibilities of a person, which brings that person 
to a state of shock or constant dejection, is arguably more harmful than injury to one’s 
arm or leg, or irreversible damage to one’s kidneys. While a person can live without a 
limb or a kidney, one might lose the taste for life if the offence to sensibilities is 
devastating and irreversible.  In extreme cases, it can cause the victims to lose their 




Argument, but rather invest more efforts to set defensible criteria for restriction. Instead 
of being discouraged from the outset, we must make greater, more rigorous attempts 
to find sensible solutions. I elaborate below.  
 
Good Environment 
In "Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression,” Scanlon speaks of a ‘good 
environment’ for expression, explaining that the central interest (especially of the 
audience) is in having a good environment for the formation of one’s beliefs and 
desires.84 Public debate is perceived as the mechanism for the realization of what the 
truth is, deduced from individuals’ conduct and their decision-making processes. 
People should be free to consider all viewpoints without government interference. In 
the name of securing ‘good environment’ for expression, the USA allows the 
establishment and operation of a Nazi party. Such a party does not openly and 
explicitly exist today in any other democracy for moral and practical reasons. Nazi 
parties embracing and spouting racist ideas are perceived as essentially immoral, with 
immoral ends and with no qualms of using immoral means to achieve them. After WWII 
and the Holocaust, most democracies (especially those that were victimized by the 
Nazis) do not think that they should take the risk of allowing such parties to operate.85 
Because Nazi ideas are vile, the Millian Argument from Truth86 is not perceived to be 
persuasive as the truth of “racism” and “final solutions” to solve the “problem” of inferior 
races is not only obscene. It is brutally inhuman, dangerous, discriminatory and 
coercive, against the democratic enshrined values of not harming others, and of 
respecting others. Yet Scanlon defends the American exceptional view on this issue, 
saying that governmental power to ban political parties is a threat to important 




power of banning parties. Scanlon does not address the question of how we should 
behave if and when society is saturated with constant threats and offensive language 
that create a poor environment for the democratic forces to work on the psyche of 
people and generate tolerant behaviour in regard to unpopular views.  
 Scanlon believes that there are consequences on having or not having 
restrictions on governmental power. He rather restricts this kind of governmental 
power. He explains that his view about hate speech laws is very close to the one set 
out by Joshua Cohen in his paper, "Freedom of Expression”.87 Because Scanlon 
accentuates that his views on the question whether we should restrict offensive 
speech is very similar to Cohen’s, let me digress and explain Cohen’s stand. 
 
Cohen’s Stringent Free Speech Protections 
Cohen aimed to present a rationale for stringent free speech protections. He does it 
by distinguishing three vital interests for free speech: expressive, deliberative and 
informational. By expressive interests Cohen refers to interest in articulating thoughts, 
attitudes and feelings also in order to influence others.88 By deliberative interests 
Cohen means doing the best thing that serves one’s interests in the most worthwhile 
way while pursuing a worthwhile course of conduct based on awareness, on having 
informed opinions and on understanding the reasons for pursuing each options. 
Finally, by informational interests Cohen assumes a fundamental interest in securing 
reliable information about the conditions required for pursuing one’s aims and 
aspirations.  
 Cohen recognizes that speech comes with costs. He distinguishes between 
direct harmful costs (e.g. defamation), environmental costs (e.g. racism which 




persuading people to go to war). When it comes to offence, Cohen argues that the 
costs of avoiding offense are to be borne by those subject to it – “they must, for 
example, “avert their eyes”.89 This sounds very much like Baker’s reasoning.90  
 However, beyond the advice that targeted victims should simply “avert their 
eyes”, Cohen goes on to suggest a general strategy in deciding whether to protect 
expression despite its price.91 The strategy is this: consider the importance of the 
expression, how direct and serious the harm is, and the vulnerability of the expression 
to under protection. Precedence is given to protect free speech because broad 
regulation of hate speech and racism would aim and almost certainly produce an 
unacceptable suppression of ideas. Cohen objects to general hate speech regulation. 
Thus he moves to consider specific cases of fighting words that arouse anger, alarm 
or resentment, conceding that regulation of hateful fighting words is acceptable.92 
 In such cases of hateful fighting words, the targets are unable to simply “avert 
their eyes” and thus regulation is permissible. But the discussion does not end here. 
Cohen adds some cautionary words before we rush to protect the vulnerable by 
restricting free speech. 93  He accentuates that “permissible” does not imply 
“recommended” because regulation has at least three defects: it might distract energy 
from other measures; it divides people who are allied in their commitment to equality, 
and it suggests a “depressingly profound loss of constructive, egalitarian, political and 
social imagination”. This argument is rather curious because the context is hate 
speech. Generally speaking, people who hate have destructive rather than 
constructive views. They do not believe in and are not committed to equality. They are 
not allied with many other segments of society and, more fundamentally, it is not clear 
why, from a moral standpoint, we should apply egalitarian protections to those who 




that people accept the basic principles upon which society is based. The basic 
principles of liberal democracy are tolerance, respect for others, and not harming 
others. These principles are rejected by the bigot thus egalitarianism may not serve 
as a rationale for protecting the bigot. As Rawls asserts, the political conception of 
justice is the “framework of basic institutions and the principles, standards, and 
percepts that apply to it, as well as how those norms are to be expressed in the 
character and attitudes of the members of society who realize its ideals”.94 Cohen 
thinks that unequal attitude toward the bigot might deprive society of its constructive 
imagination. He fails to recognize that if we won’t act to protect the target group from 
the bigot, the target group might pay a far more costly and tangible price, well beyond 
their constructive imagination.95 
Like Cohen, Scanlon thinks that offense in general cannot be recognized as 
justification for restricting expression without restricting expression that it is important 
to protect. Whether it is possible, and fair, to single out certain kinds of offense as 
permissible grounds for regulation without these bad effects is a largely empirical 
question about which Scanlon is uncertain. Scanlon writes that when Canada and the 
UK have allowed laws against pornography, or "incitement to racial hatred" “the sky 
has not fallen from the point of view of freedom of expression”.96 Scanlon does not 
think that these laws have done a whole lot of good. In Canada, Scanlon explains, 
“one of the first effects of anti-pornography laws was to shut down bookstores selling 
erotic material for gays. This illustrates that when offense can be a basis for restricting 
expression what one is most likely to get will be laws against what offends those in 
power”.97 This is a cautionary tale that does not clarify whether there is a way of 
permitting such laws that are valuable and not a threat to important interests. Scanlon 




severity of their effects (annoyance, offense, profound offense) because he suspects 
that the interests that will in practice be found most profound will be those felt by 
politically powerful groups.98 I agree that the harm of incitement to violent criminal acts 
is different and more serious than the harm of stirring up emotions.  
I posed Scanlon this question: Per Cohen’s strategy in deciding whether to 
protect expression despite its price, you need to consider the importance of the 
expression, how direct and serious the harm is, and the vulnerability of the expression 
to the under-protected. Following this, why do you think Skokie was justified? Scanlon 
replied that “the importance of the expression” has to be taken to mean the importance 
of the opportunities to engage in expression that would be lost if such restrictions were 
allowed, not the value of the particular acts of expression in question.99 However, 
even if the United States insists on being the only country in the liberal world that 
allows the establishment of a Nazi party, this does not entail complete freedom. 
American law does include time and space regulations to accommodate different 
interests. Nazis could march in downtown Chicago; why to allow them to march in 
Skokie with the explicit intention to “hurt the Jews”? Why allow abuse of freedom of 
expression? Why not balance Nazi free speech against the liberal state obligation to 
protect its vulnerable minorities? There were testimonies by psychologists on the 
possible injuries many Jews would suffer as a result of the march. They argued that 
this speech act might be regarded as the equivalent of a physical assault.100  
Scanlon further stresses that the kinds of regulation that freedom of expression 
allows have an important empirical element. With respect to hate speech, it depends 
on what the general consequences would be of allowing governments to make and 
enforce such laws. The evidence from the cases we have seems to Scanlon 




over-restriction on speech in Canada or the United Kingdom. However, although it is 
difficult to assess the relevant counterfactuals, it does not seem to Scanlon that hate 
speech laws have had a noticeably positive effect on race relations in those countries. 
This is merely an impression that Scanlon has. He does not back this statement with 
empirical data. Conversely, Amnesty International experience and research have 
indicated that prejudicial discourse can fuel discrimination and other human rights 
abuses.101 The Council of Europe Committee of Ministers recommended that States 
adopt a range of civil, criminal and administrative law provisions in order “to reconcile 
in each case respect for freedom of expression with respect for human dignity and the 
protection of the reputation or the rights of others.”102 
 
Viewpoint Neutrality 
As mentioned above, Scanlon and other American liberals invoke viewpoint neutrality. 
According to this view, the liberal state should not justify what it does by appealing to 
conceptions of the good that are subject to reasonable disagreement. State neutrality 
is perceived to be vital to ensuring stable and mutually beneficial social cooperation.103 
Scanlon writes that freedom of expression should not be restricted on the basis of its 
content, and that any form of regulation should leave ample opportunity for “at least 
the valued forms” of expression.104 It is unclear who decides, and upon which criteria, 
the valued forms of expression. Quoting Laurence Tribe,105  Scanlon argues that 
“government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content”.106 Viewpoint neutrality perceives state perfectionism, 
i.e., the promotion of a specific agenda that provides an aspired objective account of 
what is the conception of the good, as wrong. Any perfectionist agenda, including a 




consideration of different ways of life, would harden the dominant ones, whatever their 
intrinsic values may be, and would exclude unfairly the values and aspirations of 
marginalized and disadvantaged groups within the community. 107  Advocates of 
neutrality are conveying the assumption that the decision regarding the proper policy 
is crucial because of its grave consequences. Neutrality entails pluralism, diversity, 
freedom, public consensus, non-interference, vitality etc. If we do not observe 
viewpoint-neutrality, then we might be left with none of these virtues (Meiklejohn108; 
Weinstein109; Scanlon,110 Baker).111 This picture leads to the rejection of subjectivity 
(or perfectionism), while I suggest a rival view that observes conduct of policies on a 
continuous scale between strict perfectionism, on the one hand, and complete 
neutrality on the other. The policy to be adopted does not have to be either the one, 
or the other. It could well take the Aristotelian Golden Mean, allowing plurality and 
diversity without resorting to complete neutrality; acknowledging the inner dignity of 
people; involving some form of perfectionism without resorting to coercion. 
Perfectionism does not necessarily imply abuse of power or uniformity of ideas, as 
neutralists fear.  
American liberals supplement their endorsement of neutrality with other 
mechanisms, short of invoking hate speech legislation, to fight hatred and bigotry. 
They think that education, government programs such as those that deal with bias and 
diversity, and other initiatives attempting to respond to the problem of discrimination 
and hate groups without taking the step to silence or suppress those holding the 
abhorrent beliefs, are sufficient. Defenders of this position argue that preemptive legal 
approach not only minimizes hate speech, but also minimizes the beliefs that lead to 
hate speech. Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that these mechanisms, important 




years than any other type of domestic extremist (54% of all domestic extremist-related 
murders in the past 10 years).112 In 2015, political extremists killed 70 people in the 
United States. In 2016, they were responsible for the deaths of 72 people. In 2017, 37 
people were killed as a result of extremist violence, while in 2018 the death toll was 
50 people. Most of the killings are directly related to right-wing extremists.113 They are 
also a troubling source of domestic terror incidents, including 13 plots or attacks within 
the past five years. Murders and terror plots represent only the tip of the iceberg of 
white supremacist violence, as there are many more incidents involving less serious 
crimes, including attempted murders, assaults, and weapons and explosives 
violations. 114  Security experts have discerned worrying intersecting patterns that 
explain the growing violence of extreme ideologies that are built on hate and fear: 
people are becoming more disheartened and disconnected from mainstream politics; 
an administration that is friendlier toward their goals; US hate groups have seen their 
ideas enter mainstream in the Trump era; a small yet determined movement of 
activists who want the overthrow of the federal government, the reinstatement of 
slavery, the genocide of all people of color, and a white homeland.  These people are 
no longer interested in generating a crowd and mass protests of uniformed members, 
but in the creation of small cells that are committed to violence and terror. 115 
Education for tolerance and government programs addressing bias and diversity are 
important but they are unlikely to avert the danger. 
In this context, may I mention that in 2008, the twenty-seven-member European 
Union adopted a resolution declaring that “Racism and xenophobia are direct 
violations of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, principles upon which the European Union 




resolution calls upon member states to take the necessary measures to ensure that 
the following intentional conduct is punishable publicly condoning: “denying or grossly 
trivialising crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes … directed 
against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, 
colour, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin when the conduct is carried out in 
a manner likely to incite to violence or hatred against such a group or a member of 
such a group”.117  
It has been suggested that European countries are less tolerant of racism and 
hate speech because of their traumatic experience in overcoming Nazism, but this 
argument is insufficient to explain their restrictive line-drawing. Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand were not under the Nazi boot or threat, yet all three opted to adopt a 
policy that is more akin to the European than to the American. Like the United States, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand are countries of immigration but unlike the United 
States their line-drawing weighs more heavily on the side of preserving the mosaic of 
multiculturalism and protecting vulnerable third-parties than on the side of freedom of 
expression. Most countries in the free world are not willing to pay the price that the 
United States is willing to pay for protecting freedom of expression.118  
My mid-ground position between neutrality and perfectionism does not 
underestimate the importance of activities short of legislation. Education is important. 
Promoting ideas of tolerance, equality, pluralism and multiculturalism is important. 
Initiatives to fight against bias and bigotry are also important. Yet evidence shows that 
they are insufficient. Hate crimes, resulting from hate speech, are growing in numbers 
and scope in the United States. The United States is big and strong and until now it 
has tolerated the growing violence. But I do not think it should continue doing so. The 




American public and also to set an example. As the leader of the free world, the United 
States is very influential in many parts of the world. Leading by example means that 
the government should do its very best to protect its people. Acting responsibly 
requires change to avert likely violent results. Certainly, many countries in the world 
are unwilling to pay the price that the US has been paying. They cannot afford it. 
Change is required in the US now because the price in the near or not too distant 
future might be too high even for the US. 
My mid-ground position is influenced, even dictated, by two principles which 
Scanlon would accept. Any liberal society is based on the idea of respect for others, 
in the sense of treating citizens as equals, and on the idea of not harming others. 
These two principles occupy different normative spaces. The Respect for Others 
Principle is a moral more, inspired by Kantian ethics, while the Harm Principle is a central 
tenet of the democratic legal system, derived from Millian ethics. It is the Harm Principle 
that guides us in prescribing legal boundaries to conduct.  
 According to Kant, it is only through morality that a rational being can be a law-
giving member in the realm of ends, and it is only through morality that a rational being 
can be an end in itself. Kant distinguished between relative value and intrinsic value, 
explaining that people have intrinsic value, i.e. dignity. Kant identified dignity with 
moral capacity, arguing that human beings are infinitely above any price: “to compare 
it with, or weigh it against, things that have price would be to violate its holiness, as it 
were.”119 In other words, “morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of morality, 
is that which alone has dignity.”120 Kant explained that such beings are not merely 
“subjective ends” whose existence as a result of our action has value for us, but are 
“objective ends” whose existence is an end in itself.121 Each person has dignity and 




exploited. Dignity cannot be qualified due to one’s gender, race, religion, culture, class 
or any other characteristics, and it requires us to take responsibility for our conduct. 
As Dworkin suggests, the concept of dignity needs to be associated with the 
responsibilities each person must take for her own life vis-à-vis herself and others. 
Dignity requires owning up to what one has done.122  
 The argument is formulated in positive terms. It prescribes people to respect those 
who respect them but we cannot infer from it that, under all circumstances, people should 
disrespect those who disrespect them. The boundaries of tolerance are determined by 
the qualification of not harming others that is added to the Respect for Others Principle. 
Under the Millian Harm Principle, restrictions on liberty may be prescribed when there 
are clear threats of immediate violence against some individuals or groups.123  
 The Harm Principle holds that something is eligible for restriction only if it 
causes harm to others. People may interfere with the other’s liberty of action in order 
to protect themselves and to prevent harm to themselves or to others. Mill wrote in On 
Liberty: “Acts of whatever kind, which, without justifiable cause, do harm to others, 
may be, and in the more important cases absolutely require to be, controlled by the 
unfavourable sentiments, and, when needful, by the active interference of 
mankind.”124 Whether an act ought to be restricted remains to be calculated. Hence, 
in some situations, people are culpable not because of the act that they have 
performed, though this act might be morally wrong, but because of its circumstances 
and its consequences. While Kant spoke of unqualified, imperative moral duties, Mill’s 
philosophy is consequentialist in nature. Together the Kantian and Millian arguments 
make a forceful plea for moral, responsible conduct: Always perceive others as ends 




Accordingly, restrictions on liberty may be prescribed when threats of 
immediate violence are voiced against some individuals or groups. I agree with 
Scanlon and First Amendment scholars who argue that incitement and true threats are 
outside the Free Speech Principle. Elsewhere I added125 that liberal government 
should stand by the basic principles that underline liberal democracy rather than 
observe neutrality. It is within state interest to adhere to the basic ideas of respect for 
others and not harming others and to apply judgement in promoting them in their free 
speech policies. Viewpoint-neutrality on important social issues that concern the 
safeguarding of democracy might be very risky. 
My mid-ground position argues that we should take the harm in hate speech 
seriously. History has shown, time and again, the risks in hate speech and its direct 
link to hate crimes. In Political Liberalism, Rawls asserts that no society can include 
within it all forms of life. He explains that intolerant religions will cease to exist in well-
ordered societies.126 Rawls speaks of reasonable pluralism, a just basic structure 
within which permissible forms of life have a fair opportunity to maintain themselves 
while securing equal basic liberties and mutual toleration. A well-ordered society that 
is consistent with democratic values cannot be neutral toward hate speech. Hate 
speech legislation has been invoked in many liberal democracies in order to protect 
people’s dignity against assault. It is there to protect the targets’ equal status in the 
community, their entitlement to basic justice and the fundamentals of their reputation. 
Waldron maintains that there is a sort of public good of inclusiveness that our society 
sponsors and that it is committed to. Hate speech undermines this public good, or it 
makes the task of sustaining it much more difficult than it would otherwise be.127 Hate 
speech creates an environmental threat to social peace, a “sort of slow-acting poison, 




less natural for even the good-hearted members of the society to play their part in 
maintaining this public good”.128 Waldron argues that hate speech seeks to establish 
a rival public good as “the wolves call to one another across the peace of a decent 
society”.129 
Granted that the line-drawing of what constitutes hate is not always simple. On 
the one hand, statements that assert “Jews are money hungry,” “gays are immoral,” 
“Blacks go back to Africa,” “A Woman’s place is in the Kitchen!”, "F*ck The Police", 
“Israel is an apartheid state” and calls to boycott Israel are all unpleasant yet I think 
legitimate speech. It is noted that some of these statements might be actionable hate 
speech in some countries. The problem is that there is no single definition of hate 
speech and hate speech legislation varies from one country to another.130 On the 
other hand, calls that provoke violence against target groups fall under the definition 
of incitement; here the context is of harmful speech that is directly linked to harmful 
action. Malicious hate speech that is aimed to victimize and dehumanize its target, 
often (but not always) vulnerable minorities, and call to act violently against them 
should not enjoy the protection of the Free Speech Principle. 
Adhering to liberal reasoning, my argument places the individual at the center 
in examining whether the individual needs protection from certain expressions 
because they might offend one’s emotional and spiritual system. Recognizing the 
dignity of each and every person, it supplements the Harm Principle with the Offence 
to Sensibilities Argument, arguing that this Argument in and of itself can serve as 
grounds for restricting freedom of expression in extreme cases when the offence is 
severe; even more so when the target group (individual or individuals) cannot avoid 
being exposed to the offence, and the consequences of the offence might be 




 The content of the expression. 
 The manner of expression. 
 The duration and intensity of the offence.  
 The frequency of the offence. 
 The intentions of the speaker. 
 The circumstances which include the avoidability standard and the presence of 
mitigating factors. 
 Consequences of speech. 
 
It is incumbent on those who restrict speech on grounds of profound offence to 
examine all the above factors. Not all of these factors are essential, and we may decide 
to prohibit certain expressions also when the intentions of the speaker are not explicitly 
pronounced, and when the target group can avoid exposure to the offence, though 
members of the target group are still aware of its existence. Speakers should not be 
callous about expressing profound offence when they have reasons to believe that 
their speech might result in loss of life. It is emphasized that we are dealing with an 
especially offensive expression that might damage the sensibilities of the individuals 
whom the speaker wishes to offend.  
 
Conclusion 
Many American liberals, including Scanlon 131  (and also Baker; 132  Meiklejohn 133 ) 
endorse viewpoint-neutrality especially where social and political speech is 
concerned. I think that people, as rational and moral beings, can recognize evil when 
they see it and argue on moral grounds that certain kinds of speech are beyond 




bring societal changes. I would not defend speakers who hold "Gays should burn in 
the fires of hell", “Jews are good for gas chambers” or “Good Arabs are dead Arabs.” 
Unfortunately, those assertions are not the fruits of my imagination. Scanlon said in 
his remarks on this paper that he would not defend such speakers. But he immediately 
maintained his overriding principle which is suspicion of government. The 
permissibility of restricting speech depends for Scanlon on the general consequences 
of giving governments the power to regulate speech on certain grounds.  
In a democracy, people must enjoy absolute freedom to advocate and debate 
ideas, but this is so long as they refrain from abusing this freedom to attack the rights 
of others or their status in society as human beings and equal members of the 
community. The freedom of one should be balanced and weighed against the freedom 
of others. Democracy is founded on two basic principles: respect for others, and not 
harming others. These principles are the lighthouse according to which democratic 
morality and policies are formed. There is right and wrong. There is a standard, a moral 
compass that guides our reasoning. Not all views have equal standing in society, just 
as not all actions have equal standing. 
   Limitations on freedom of expression should be crafted with great care. Whenever 
we come to restrict speech, the onus for limiting free expression is always with the one 
who wishes to limit expression, and that one should bring concrete evidence to justify 
restriction. The speech must be dangerous and/or harmful. The danger and/or harm 
cannot be implicit or implied. If speech would be prohibited only because its danger 
might be implied from an unclear purpose that is open for interpretations, then the 
scope for curtailing fundamental democratic rights is too broad, and the slippery-slope 
syndrome becomes tangible. The implicit way is not the path that liberals should tread 




should not be vigilant in protecting our democracy. But mere suspicion (“bad 
tendency”) 134  will not do to override basic freedoms. Boundaries to freedom of 
expression should be introduced with caution and due process. But they should be 
introduced. Freedom of expression needs to be balanced against no less important 
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